GovKM Proposed Standards and Guidance
Preserve the Source and History Behind Information
Distinguish source information from derivatives and preserve attributable evidence of material changes and missing history.
GovKM-proposed public draft. Published for public review. Not externally accredited or endorsed.
View the EICARS framework resourceDocument
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EICARS implementation guidance — proposed public draft. Checklist coverage: R03.1, R03.2, R03.3, R03.4. Prepared November 9, 2026. These suggested approaches support the published GovKM-proposed EICARS v0.1 draft; they do not add requirements or grant external accreditation.
Purpose and use
Distinguish source information from derivatives and preserve attributable evidence of material changes and missing history.
Use this guide within a declared organizational scope, with existing repositories and suitable organizational processes. AI is optional. Examples and suggested evidence are implementation aids; the published standard governs a conformance assessment. The Riverton case below is fictional, not an observed deployment or test result.
Responsible roles
Source owners, records officials and platform administrators within their assigned responsibilities.
Assign responsibilities through the organization’s actual instruments. A suggested role in this guide does not itself confer decision authority.
R03.1 Distinguish originals and derived information
Suggested approach: Describe the role of originals, authorized copies, exports, OCR text, reports and other derived information. Keep a usable reference to the source and relevant version when a transformation matters to interpretation. Document material conversion limitations, such as missing annotations or formulas. A derivative can have its own recordkeeping significance; records staff determine the treatment.
Riverton example: The Riverton briefing cites the facilities report rather than treating an extracted paragraph as the complete report. The extraction notes that the signed attachment must be consulted for the inspection’s approval evidence.
Evidence and completion check: Retain the source reference and transformation description. Compare a representative derivative with its source and identify omissions that could change the business interpretation.
R03.2 Retain evidence of material changes
Suggested approach: Use existing version history, workflow records or controlled change logs to retain attributable evidence of material changes. Record actor or system, time and reason where available. Define materiality according to business and legal need. If a reason was never captured, state that limitation; do not manufacture a plausible history.
Riverton example: A Riverton readiness report corrects an inspection finding. The prior revision remains distinguishable, and the correction evidence identifies the responsible office and when the correction was recorded.
Evidence and completion check: Show the prior state, changed state and available attribution. Retain the approved correction evidence and describe gaps. Cybersecurity event logs alone may not explain the business reason for a change.
R03.3 Protect history and source evidence
Suggested approach: Protect necessary source and history records against unauthorized alteration or loss. Apply access, preservation, recovery and retention controls appropriate to their sensitivity and business role. Avoid retaining every log indefinitely: records, security, privacy and legal officials should determine applicable periods and holds.
Riverton example: An ordinary Riverton contributor cannot overwrite the protected approval record. Authorized corrections follow the established process and preserve the evidence needed to understand the change.
Evidence and completion check: Examine access configuration and an approved safe alteration or recovery demonstration. Retain the result, recovery limitations and applicable retention decisions; a backup by itself does not prove a usable history.
R03.4 Expose missing history and uncertainty
Suggested approach: Make missing provenance visible at the time of assessment. State what is supported, what is unknown, who is responsible for review and which uses remain limited. Content comparisons and integrity checks may help detect alteration, but cannot establish who had authority to approve a document.
Riverton example: An old Riverton report has no reliable approval history. Staff can describe its contents while withholding the claim that it was the approved readiness determination.
Evidence and completion check: Keep the dated gap finding and supporting observations. Ask a reviewer to separate verified facts from assumptions and confirm that an unresolved item has not silently been marked complete.
Evidence and completion checks
Agree the population, expected results and acceptance conditions before assessing. Record the date, assessor, evidence reference, observed result and limitation. Use approved safe examples for access, malicious-content or lifecycle tests. Documented policy and observed operating behavior are both relevant; one does not automatically prove the other.
On smaller screens, scroll the table horizontally to view every column.
| Item | Suggested evidence and demonstration |
|---|---|
| R03.1 | Retain the source reference and transformation description. Compare a representative derivative with its source and identify omissions that could change the business interpretation. |
| R03.2 | Show the prior state, changed state and available attribution. Retain the approved correction evidence and describe gaps. Cybersecurity event logs alone may not explain the business reason for a change. |
| R03.3 | Examine access configuration and an approved safe alteration or recovery demonstration. Retain the result, recovery limitations and applicable retention decisions; a backup by itself does not prove a usable history. |
| R03.4 | Keep the dated gap finding and supporting observations. Ask a reviewer to separate verified facts from assumptions and confirm that an unresolved item has not silently been marked complete. |
Record a gap where the required outcome is not demonstrated. Assign an owner and review date, then verify any correction. Completion of this page alone does not demonstrate conformance with all ten domains, certify legal compliance, approve an AI deployment or authorize autonomous actions.
Common mistakes
Overwriting relevant prior states; inventing missing history; treating a checksum as proof of approval.
Continue the checklist
Use this page with the EICARS standard, the identity guide and the full Riverton scenario. No particular product, model or repository migration is required.
Implementation overview
Suggested operating approach: assign the responsible roles, confirm applicability, implement suitable controls in the existing environment, examine operating evidence and track unresolved gaps. Tailor the methods to scale and risk. Maintain current services during preparation and preserve records, access and legal obligations throughout.
Standards traceability and references
Version history
November 9, 2026 — Publication authorized by GovKM. Guidance based on checklist and government authority reference package checked November 5, 2026. References must be periodically revalidated.
November 9, 2026 — Expanded implementation guidance, version 0.1. Replaced the shorter implementation text with the reviewed Riverton examples, task-specific approaches, evidence checks and official authority mappings, with Robert Noyes’s approval. Existing URLs and checklist anchors are preserved. No EICARS requirement or GovKM doctrine is amended.