GAO 27-108656: When a Cyber Threat Crosses Agencies, Who Has the Information to Respond?
What GAO found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), lead federal efforts to improve cybersecurity in the food and agriculture sector. In its November 19, 2026 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessed the cybersecurity aspects of 16 statutory requirements. The agencies met 11. They partially met or did not meet five requirements involving information sharing and emergency preparedness. Both agencies cited resource and staffing constraints. GAO-27-108656
GAO recommended that USDA and HHS address gaps in sharing threat and vulnerability information with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and in conducting or facilitating cybersecurity preparedness exercises. GAO also recommended that HHS address a gap in developing plans for coordinated action during cybersecurity emergencies. HHS agreed with its three recommendations. USDA disagreed with its two, and GAO maintained that both were warranted. GAO findings and recommendations
The Organizational Information Continuity challenge
Can the receiving team tell which alert is current and what it is authorized to do? A team can receive an accurate alert that is later revised or withdrawn. If the update, the originating authority, and the distribution record are spread across different systems, an incoming responder may act on the copy that happens to be easiest to find. A future AI assistant could cite that same authentic but superseded alert as current guidance. Without a traceable revision history and clear sharing permissions, staff would have difficulty checking the answer before using it.
Can the next exercise show whether the last one changed anything? An after-action report may identify a coordination gap. The assignment to fix it, the approved plan revision, and the evidence from a retest may live with different teams. If those records cannot be traced to one another, the next exercise planner may have to reconstruct whether the gap remains open and which plan the teams should practice. A future AI assistant could summarize a proposed fix as completed or give responders a role assignment from an older plan. The two AI risks are GovKM’s assessment of how missing evidence or stale authority could affect future use.
GovKM’s proposed approach
- Keep a traceable record of each alert and handoff. Have agency program owners identify the authoritative source for an alert, its approving role, its effective time, and its permitted recipients. Assign a stable identifier and link corrections or withdrawals to the original. Where the operating procedure calls for acknowledgment, record it separately from transmission so an incoming team can tell whether responsibility was accepted. These controls support the information-sharing duties in 6 U.S.C. § 665d(c)(4), including facilitating information exchange and maintaining awareness of identified threats. The agencies would determine what information may be shared, with whom, and through which authorized systems.
- Connect exercises to the plans and decisions they change. Record the approved plan version used in each exercise. Link each material finding to a responsible role, a due date, any resulting plan revision, and the evidence used to accept the fix. Leave findings open when that evidence is missing. The agencies can use this record to support coordinated planning and preparedness exercises under 6 U.S.C. § 665d(c)(6). Maintain the authoritative records under applicable agency schedules and access rules. 44 U.S.C. § 3101 establishes the documentation duty, and 36 C.F.R. § 1222.22 requires agencies to prescribe records that support action by successors and document substantive decisions and actions.
- Make authority and evidence visible in AI-assisted retrieval. In a proposed OrgAI pilot, GovKM would test whether authorized users can retrieve an alert or plan together with its source, active version, responsible role, and supporting evidence. An answer about readiness should identify the record that supports it and flag when verification is missing. The agency’s designated officials would continue to approve alerts, determine response authority, and accept corrective-action closure. The pilot would measure whether staff can verify the answers under their actual access permissions and records rules.
How to verify the handoff
Run a tabletop exercise with a revised alert, a change of lead role during a shift, and a corrective action awaiting retest. Ask the incoming team to identify the active alert, confirm who accepted the handoff, cite the governing plan, and explain the evidence required to close the finding. If AI is included, ask the same questions and verify each answer against the approved records. Include a historical query to confirm that the prior alert is still retrievable as history, and use an account without access to restricted material to verify that the answer respects that boundary.
The method also applies when a grocery distributor hands a disruption response from its overnight operations team to a regional manager and an outside logistics provider. The teams can preserve which supplier notice was current, who accepted responsibility, and which changes had been verified. Their own contracts, information-sharing permissions, and records rules would govern that workflow. GovKM’s analysis of Continuity of Operations and Information Continuity explains why keeping these relationships intact matters when the people, systems, or authorities change.
If your team needs to prove what information a responder had, which plan applied, or whether an exercise finding was closed, contact GovKM to assess one handoff and test whether the evidence survives a change in personnel or systems.



